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Multiple Representation in Shareholder
Derivative Suits: A Case-by-Case Approach
INTRODUCTION
The shareholder derivative suit is an action by which a plaintiff-
shareholder asserts a claim against the corporate entity and direc-
tors, officers or third parties who have allegedly wronged the cor-
poration.' Corporate counsel may, in such actions, wish to
represent both the corporation and the individual director-officer
defendants. Multiple representation2 may, however, run afoul of
ethical guidelines which prohibit conflicts of interest.'
The approaches taken by courts and commentators on the issue
have not been consistent.4 While some courts have taken the view
that the corporate and individual defendants should always be in-
dependently represented, others permit multiple representation in
certain factual settings.' The Model Code of Professional Respon-
sibility6 ("Model Code") provides guidelines which assist the
1. H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS 1036 (3d ed. 1983). The derivative suit was
developed in the equity courts as a remedy which provided redress when management
refused to pursue or neglected to vigorously pursue the rights of the corporation against
directors, officers, or third parties who had damaged or threatened the interests of the
corporation. W. KNEPPER, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS 525-
26 (3d ed. 1978). See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970), which held that the right to
trial by jury extends to derivative actions.
2. "Multiple representation," as used throughout this note, refers to a single attorney
or attorneys from a single firm who represent or seek to represent both the corporation
and one or more of the individual director-officer defendants.
3. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT ("MODEL RULES") Rule
1.7 (1983); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY ("MODEL CODE") DR 5-
105 (1980). See infra notes 35-39, 103-105 and accompanying text for a discussion of
these rules.
4. See infra notes 59-95 and accompanying text.
5. Id.
6. The Model Code was adopted by the American Bar Association in 1970 and by
1979 had been adopted at least in part by all states except California. See California State
Bar Standing Comm. on Professional Responsibility and Conduct, Formal Op. 71 (1983),
which stated that the Model Code may be persuasive authority as to ethical problems not
specifically addressed by California rules or decisions. The American Bar Association
replaced the Model Code in August of 1983 with the Model Rules, but the ethics rules of
forty-seven states are still patterned after the Model Code. Some federal courts have also
adopted the Model Code as the ethical standard governing the conduct of attorneys prac-
ticing before them. See, e.g., N.D. ILL. R. 8(a), (d); E.D. PA. R. 11.
The Model Code consists of three separate but interrelated parts: Canons, Ethical
Considerations ("EC's") and Disciplinary Rules ("DR's").
The Canons are statements of axiomatic norms, expressing in general terms the
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courts in their evaluation, but a uniform approach to the issue has
not yet emerged.7
Resolution of the multiple representation issue must involve a
careful balancing of the corporation's right to a choice of counsel
and the importance of adhering to the highest ethical standards by
avoiding conflicts of interest. This note proposes that the issue
may best be resolved by a detailed, case-by-case analysis which fo-
cuses on the particular facts present in each derivative action and
the harmony or divergence of the interests of the corporate defend-
ant and the individual director-officer defendants. The recently
adopted Model Rules of Professional Conduct' ("Model Rules")
provide an excellent framework for such analysis.
This note will first examine, in relation to the Model Code, the
ethical problems inherent in any derivative action. Cases which
have addressed these problems, with widely varying results, will'
then be considered. The focus will then turn to the Model Rules
and the applicability of the approach they suggest.
BACKGROUND
The Ethical Problems Inherent in Multiple Representation
The issue of the propriety of multiple representation arises in
part from the unique procedural aspects of derivative actions,
which are, in legal effect, suits brought by the corporation but con-
ducted by the shareholders. 9 The corporation occupies a dual posi-
standards of professional conduct expected of lawyers in their relationships with
the public, with the legal system, and with the legal profession. They embody
the general concepts from which the Ethical Considerations and the Discipli-
nary Rules are derived. The Ethical Considerations are aspirational in charac-
ter and represent the objectives toward which every member of the profession
should strive. They constitute a body of principles upon which the lawyer can
rely for guidance in many specific situations.
The Disciplinary Rules, unlike the Ethical Considerations, are mandatory in
character. The Disciplinary Rules state the minimum level of conduct below
which no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary action.
MODEL CODE Preamble and Preliminary Statement. For a discussion of the Model Code
as it relates to the issue of multiple representation, see infra notes 34-42 and accompany-
ing text.
7. See infra notes 59-95 and accompanying text.
8. For a discussion of the Model Rules as they relate to the issue of multiple represen-
tation, see infra notes 96-105, 124-31, 135-37 and accompanying text.
9. 13 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §
5939 (1980). Fletcher explains the dual nature of the derivative suit as follows:
[A] stockholders' suit . . . is a suit having a double aspect. The stockholders
have a right in equity to compel the assertion of a corporate right of action
against the directors or other wrongdoers when the corporation wrongfully re-
fuses to sue. The suit is thus an action for specific enforcement of an obligation
[Vol. 16
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tion in such litigation: while formally aligned as a defendant, it is
the real party plaintiff and the beneficiary of any recovery resulting
from a successful claim.10 The interests of the corporation appear,
therefore, to be closely linked with those of the individual plaintiff-
shareholders. Where, for example, directors and officers are
charged with fraud or illegality, the corporation and the plaintiff-
shareholders have a common interest in reclaiming any fraudu-
lently obtained benefits." The corporation will, in such cases, re-
tain the passive stance of a nominal defendant. 12
Unity of interest between the corporation and its shareholders is
not, however, always present in a derivative action. This is exem-
plified by the strike suit, an action generally brought by minority
shareholders who hope that the nuisance value of meritless actions
will generate rapid settlement by corporate defendants. 3 In such
owed by the corporation to the stockholders to assert its rights of action when
the corporation has been put in default by the wrongful refusal of the directors
or management to make suitable measures for its protection.
Id. § 5941.1
10. H. HENN, supra note 1, at 1037. The plaintiff-shareholder may, of course, indi-
rectly benefit as a part of the entire community of corporate interests: shareholders, direc-
tors, officers and creditors. Id.
In certain limited situations, courts have permitted individual shareholder recoveries in
which the shareholder receives a pro rata share of what the corporation would have re-
ceived. Id. at 1096-97. The pro rata recovery has been permitted in three situations.
First, where the action is against inside directors who have misappropriated corporate
assets, recovery by shareholders prevents the funds from reverting to the control of the
wrongdoers. Id. at 1097; see Backus v. Finkelstein, 23 F.2d 531 (D. Minn. 1924); Dill v.
Johnson, 72 Okla. 149, 179 P. 608 (1919); Eaton v. Robinson, 19 R.I. 146, 32 A. 339
(1895). Second, where there are both "guilty" and "innocent" shareholders the pro rata
method limits recovery to the "innocent" ones. H. HENN, supra note 1, at 1097; see
Brown v. De Young, 167 Ill 549, 47 N.E. 863 (1897); Di Tomasso v. Loverro, 250 A.D.
206, 293 N.Y.S. 912 (1937), affd mem., 276 N.Y. 551, 12 N.E. 2d 570 (1937). Finally,
where the corporation is no longer a going concern, pro rata recovery facilitates distribu-
tion of funds. H. HENN, supra note 1, at 1097; see Bailey v. Jacobs, 325 Pa. 187, 189 A.
320 (1937). Pro rata recovery is not generally permitted where creditors' rights are in-
volved. Some courts have refused to permit pro rata recoveries on the ground that they
are inconsistent with the nature of derivative remedies; other courts disallow pro rata
recovery because they view it as a forced dividend inconsistent with the corporation's
business judgment. H. HENN, supra note 1, at 1098.
11. ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 91:2602 (1984).
12. H. HENN, supra note 1, at 1085.
13. Id. at 1039; see Comment, Independent Representation for Corporate Defendants
in Derivative Suits, 74 YALE L.J. 524, 529-30 (1963).
Because strike suits abuse the availability of the derivative action, statutes and case law
in many jurisdictions have created various procedural obstacles which must be overcome
by derivative action plaintiffs. First, in order to sue derivatively, a shareholder must, in
the majority of jurisdictions, have been a shareholder at the time of the alleged wrong or
the shares must have later devolved upon the shareholder by operation of law. H. HENN,
supra note 1, at 1058-59.
A second requirement involves the exhaustion of intracorporate remedies. A plaintiff-
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instances, the interests of the corporation and the named plaintiffs
diverge. The corporation may raise certain procedural defenses to
the derivative action14 and may in some limited circumstances be
permitted to actively defend on the merits.15 Although the simul-
taneous representation of named defendants superficially involves
no conflict of interest, the anomalous dual role of the corporation,
the divergent interests often present, and the procedural choices
available to the corporation result in an inherent potential for ethi-
cal problems whenever one attorney represents both the corpora-
tion and the individual defendants.1 6
Further complicating the analysis of the propriety of multiple
representation is the issue of client consent. Ethical guidelines
which deal generally with conflicts of interest require informed and
objective consent to the multiple representation from the client.1 7
In a derivative suit, however, the client consent frequently comes
from corporate directors who are themselves individual defend-
shareholder's complaint must generally allege either the fact that a demand was made
upon the board, and if necessary, the shareholders, or it must state the reason why such a
demand would have been futile. Id. at 1067.
As an additional protection against strike suits, several jurisdictions permit defendant
corporations to obtain from the plaintiff-shareholders security for the corporation's litiga-
tion expenses. Id. at 1089. Despite these procedural obstacles, strike suits continue to
occur, and lucrative fees awarded to plaintiffs' counsel remain a significant inducement to
derivative actions. Comment, supra, at 530 n.31.
14. H. HENN, supra note 1, at 1085; Note, Disqualification of Corporate Counsel in
Derivative Actions: Jacuzzi and the Inadequacy of Dual Representation, 31 HASTINGS L.J.
347, 350-51 (1979). These procedural defenses are sui generis to derivative actions and
have arisen from efforts to protect the corporation's interests and curtail the use of strike
suits and collusive diversity jurisdiction. H. HENN, supra note 1, at 1085. Procedural
defenses may be interposed by the corporate defendant when plaintiffs fail to make a
demand on the board of directors to bring suit, when proper service of process is not
made, or when plaintiffs do not comply with the requirements of contemporaneous own-
ership. Id.; Comment, supra note 13, at 530-31. The corporate defendant may also move
that the plaintiff be required to provide security for expenses. H. HENN, supra note 1, at
1089.
15. H. HENN, supra note 1, at 1084. In certain situations in which the corporation is
a real defendant, for example, where the complaint seeks appointment of a receiver or
seeks to interfere with a corporate reorganization, the corporation will be permitted to
answer and actively defend on the merits. In cases in which the corporation is only a
nominal defendant, it is generally precluded from defending on the merits. Id. at 1085-
86. But see Otis & Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 57 F. Supp. 680 (E.D. Pa. 1944), affd per
curiam, 155 F.2d 522 (3d Cir. 1946). See infra notes 64-68 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Otis court's holding that the corporation could defend on the merits
when plaintiffs attempted to interfere with long-established corporate policy.
For a complete discussion of defenses available to the various parties, see Note, De-
fenses in Shareholders'Derivative Suits - Who May Raise Them, 66 HARV. L. REV. 342,
346-47 (1952).
16. Note, supra note 14, at 348-49; Comment, supra note 13, at 524.
17. See, e.g., MODEL RULES Rule 1.7; MODEL CODE DR 5-105.
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ants. 8 In view of the potential self-interest involved, it has been
suggested that extreme caution be exercised when applying consent
provisions to the corporate setting. 19
Relationships which exist among corporate attorneys, share-
holders, directors and officers often increase the likelihood of con-
flict.2" The corporation is recognized in law as an entity,21 and
ethical guidelines recognize that a corporate attorney's loyalties
must at all times run to that entity. 22 Determining a course of ac-
tion that is most consistent with the entity's best interests may,
however, be extremely difficult. The directors who possess man-
agement power and the shareholders, particularly minority share-
holders, may strongly disagree as to the propriety of a particular
course of action.23 The lawyer's own assessment of the best course
of action may be influenced by strong loyalties to the majority di-
rectors and officers with whom he has primarily worked, 24 and by
his understandably strong desire to defend corporate transactions
which resulted from his contributions to the decision-making
process.25
Corporate decision makers must, upon instigation of a derivative
suit, evaluate the merits of the action and determine the role to be
assumed by the corporation. 26  In arriving at a decision that ac-
18. Comment, supra note 13, at 528. Accord Cannon v. U.S. Acoustics Corp., 398 F.
Supp. 209, 214 (N.D. Ill. 1975), affd in part, rev'd in part, 532 F.2d 1118 (7th Cir. 1976).
19. Ass'n of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 842 (1960); see infra
notes 132-37 and accompanying text.
20. Comment, supra note 13, at 528; Shipman, Professonal Responsibilities of the Cor-
porate Lawyer, in ABA PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, A GUIDE FOR ATFORNEYS
271, 274 (1978).
21. H. HENN, supra note 1, at 16.
22. See e.g., MODEL CODE EC 5-18 ("A lawyer employed or retained by a corpora-
tion owes his allegiance to the entity and not to a stockholder, director, officer, employee,
representative or other person connected with the entity."); MODEL RULES Rule 1.13
("A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization acting
through its duly authorized constituents.")
23. Indeed, many derivative actions result from minority shareholder response to
what they perceive as the erroneous business judgment of majority directors. See, e.g.,
Otis & Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 57 F. Supp 680 (E.D. Pa. 1944) (an attack on the
propriety of a corporate bond issue), aff'd per curiam, 155 F.2d 522 (3d Cir. 1946);
Jacuzzi v. Jacuzzi Bros., Inc., 243 Cal. App. 201. 52 Cal. Rptr. 147 (1966) (action seeking
rescission of corporation's sale of foreign holdings).
24. See Shipman, supra note 20, at 280.
25. Id.
26. In Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, the Delaware Supreme Court stated: "'We recog-
nize that the final substantive judgment whether a particular lawsuit should be main-
tained requires a balance of many factors - ethical, commercial, promotional, public
relations, employee relations, fiscal as well as legal.'" Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430
A.2d 779, 788 (Del. 1981) (quoting Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274, 285
(S.D.N.Y. 1980)).
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commodates the interests of all, it has become common practice for
corporate boards of directors to delegate to "independent litigation
committees" the responsibility of determining whether a derivative
action is in the best interests of the corporation.27 The committee
investigates the action, sometimes with the aid of independent spe-
cial counsel, accountants and other experts.2 s If the committee is
indeed independent and acts in good faith and with due diligence,
the committee's decisions will be assessed under the "business
judgment rule."' 29 A committee determination that the suit is not
in the corporation's best interest will in most circumstances bar the
action. 3°
Model Code Treatment of Multiple Representation
Multiple representation in a derivative action involves a poten-
tial conflict of interest 31 between the corporate and individual de-
27. Litigation committees are typically established following the shareholder demand
which is a prerequisite to a derivative action. H. HENN, supra note 1, at 1074. See supra
note 13. The board may also appoint a committee where demand is not made because
such demand would be futile. H. HENN, supra note 1, at 1074; see Zapata, 430 A.2d at
785-86. (demand excused where all directors were named as defendants).
Even boards consisting entirely of alleged wrongdoers have appointed independent liti-
gation committees after electing the prospective committee members as directors. H.
HENN, supra note 1, at 1074; see, e.g., Zapata, 430 A.2d at 781.
28. H. HENN, supra note 1, at 1074.
29. Id. The "business judgment" rule is defined by Henn as follows:
If in the course of management, directors arrive at a decision, within the corpo-
ration's powers (intra vires) and their authority, for which there is a reasonable
basis, and they act in good faith, as the result of their independent discretion
and judgment, and uninfluenced by any consideration other than what they
honestly believe to be in the best interests of the corporation, a court will not
interfere with internal management and substitute its judgment for that of the
directors ....
Id. at 661.
30. Id. at 1074-75; see also Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761, 772 (9th Cir. 1981)
(summary judgment dismissing action on basis of litigation committee's determination);
Lewis v. S.L. & E., Inc., 629 F.2d 764, 772 (2d Cir. 1980) (decision against litigation by
interested directors held not to be an exercise of business judgment); Grynberg v. Farmer,
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,683 (D. Colo. 1980) (litigation committee found to be
biased); Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (business judgment
rule held applicable to litigation committee decision); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d
619, 635, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1003, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 930 (1979) (summary judgment up-
held based on litigation committee's determination that derivative action was not in best
interest of corporation).
The Delaware courts have applied a two-step approach to review of litigation commit-
tee decisions. First, defendants must prove that the committee acted independently and
in good faith. Should this requirement be satisfied, the trial court then exercises its "in-
dependent business judgment" as to whether the decision was in the best interests of the
corporation. H. HENN, supra note 1, at 1076; see, e.g., Zapata, 430 A.2d at 788-89.
31. "Conflict of interest" is not expressly defined in ethical standards, but the Model
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fendants.32 The Model Code33 does not specifically address the
issue of conflicts within the context of derivative suits. Several of
its provisions are, however, relevant to an examination of the ethi-
cal implications of multiple representation in general and have
been relied upon by courts which have analyzed the issue.3'
Canon 5 of the Model Code, which addresses the ethical issues
involved in representing conflicting interests, provides that a law-
yer "should exercise independent professional judgment on behalf
of a client."' 35 Disciplinary Rule ("DR") 5-105, dealing specifically
with multiple representation, requires an attorney, in some in-
stances, to decline employment by multiple clients having poten-
tially adverse interests. 36 DR 5-105(C) permits such employment
only if it is obvious that the lawyer can adequately represent each
client's interests and each client consents to the representation af-
ter full disclosure of the potential effects of multiple representation
upon the lawyer's independent professional judgment.37 Ethical
Consideration ("EC") 5-15 states that all doubts should be re-
solved against the propriety of the representation. a
EC 5-18 deals with multiple representation in the corporate con-
text. The provision recognizes the complex relationships which
may exist among an attorney, management and shareholders. It
also acknowledges the fact that the interests of the corporation
must at all times be paramount. EC 5-18 states that a lawyer re-
tained by a corporation owes his allegiance to the entity and not to
Rules describe a conflict situation as that in which a lawyer's representation of a client is
directly adverse to another client or may be materially limited by the lawyer's other re-
sponsibilities or own interests. MODEL RULES Rule 1.7; see infra notes 96-105 and ac-
companying text.
32. Cannon v. U.S. Acoustics Corp., 398 F. Supp. 209, 215 (N.D. Ill. 1975), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 532 F.2d 1118 (7th Cir. 1976); see also Note, supra note 14, at 348-49.
33. See supra note 6.
34. For a discussion of judicial treatment of multiple representation, see infra notes
59-95 and accompanying text.
35. MODEL CODE Canon 5.
36. MODEL CODE DR 5-105. EC 5-14 also provides guidance, stating that:
Maintaining the independence of professional judgment required of a lawyer
precludes his acceptance or continuation of employment that will adversely af-
fect his judgment on behalf of or dilute his loyalty to a client. This problem
arises whenever a lawyer is asked to represent two or more clients who may
have differing interests, whether such interests be conflicting, inconsistent, di-
verse, or otherwise discordant.
MODEL CODE EC 5-14.
37. MODEL CODE DR 5-105 (C). For a discussion of the applicability of consent
provisions to derivative suits, see supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text and infra
notes 132-37 and accompanying text.
38. MODEL CODE EC 5-15.
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any individual. A lawyer may represent a director, officer or share-
holder in an individual capacity only if he is convinced that con-
flicting interests are not present. 39
Another provision of the Model Code, Canon 9, provides that an
attorney "should avoid even the appearances of professional im-
propriety." 4 While the Disciplinary Rules under Canon 9 do not
directly pertain to conflicts of interest,41 the general duty proposed
by the Canon has been used as an additional tool in resolving con-
flict of interest issues.42
The Model Code provides valuable ethical guidance to the bar
39. MODEL CODE EC 5-18.
40. MODEL CODE Canon 9.
41. The Disciplinary Rules under Canon 9 deal with transition from the judicial or
public sector to the private sector and with preservation of client property and funds.
MODEL CODE DR's 9-101, 9-102.
EC 9-6 sets forth a more general guideline by providing that:
Every lawyer owes a solemn duty to uphold the integrity and honor of his
profession, to encourage respect for the law. . . , to conduct himself so as to
reflect credit on the legal profession and to inspire the confidence, respect, and
trust of his clients and of the public; and to strive to avoid not only professional
impropriety but also the appearance of impropriety.
MODEL CODE EC 9-6.
42. ABA STANDING COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE, THE JUDICIAL RE-
SPONSE TO LAWYER MISCONDUCT VII.6 (1984) [hereinafter cited as JUDICIAL RE-
SPONSE]; see Emle Industries, Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 571 (2d Cir. 1973)
(Canon 9 used in conjunction with Canon 4, which involves client confidences); see also
infra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
In addition to the conflict of interest problems, multiple representation in derivative
suits involves a potential threat to client confidences. DR 4-101 of the Model Code pro-
vides that a lawyer may not reveal the secrets and confidences of a client. " 'Confidence'
refers to information protected by the attorney-client privilege under applicable law, and
'secret' refers to other information gained in the professional relationship that the client
has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarassing or would
likely be detrimental to the client." MODEL CODE DR 4-101. In the case of individuals,
preservation of confidences may present a serious obstacle to multiple representation be-
cause an attorney might jeopardize the confidences of one client while concurrently repre-
senting another. Cannon, 398 F. Supp. at 216. This consideration is of less import in the
corporate context, however, as the secrets and confidences of the corporate entity will in
most instances be totally accessible to director-officer defendants. Id. at 216-17; see Com-
ment, supra note 13, at 528-29. But see Marco v. Dulles, 169 F. Supp. 622, 628-30
(S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 268 F.2d 192 (2d Cir. 1959), where the court held that dual
representation in derivative suits could involve a danger to corporate confidences in view
of the fact that, when former directors are implicated, there may be recent secrets and
confidences in the files of counsel wholly unknown to former directors.
Conversely, confidences reposed by directors or officers in the corporate counsel must
be known to the corporation because the directors constitute the only "voice and hear-
ing" of the corporation. See Marco, 169 F. Supp. at 628. A concern that counsel will
divulge corporate confidences, or vice versa, appears, therefore, to be largely illusory.
Comment, supra note 13, at 529. Accord Cannon, 398 F. Supp. at 216-17. As noted by
the Cannon court, however, the possibility of release of confidences or secrets, however
slim, is "one more reason to examine dual representation with caution." Id. at 217.
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and the bench, but does not attempt to provide for all eventualities
which may arise in practice. Ultimate resolution of the multiple
representation issue and reasoned application of the ethical guide-
lines presented in the Model Code rest with the courts.43
Judicial Evaluation of Conflicts of Interest
Before proceeding to a review of cases which deal with conflicts
of interest in derivative suits, it is instructive to briefly examine
judicial treatment of conflicts in general. Courts are vested with
considerable discretion in reviewing motions for disqualification
and evaluating ethical guidelines.' In considering motions to dis-
qualify opposing counsel,45 courts have attempted to balance two
policies: the client's right to be represented by freely chosen coun-
sel and the need to preserve the highest standards of professional
responsibility.46
The majority of circuits apply Canon 5 and DR 5-105"7 in deter-
mining whether concurrent multiple representation may con-
tinue.48 Another frequently used test requires disqualification
43. See infra notes 44-95 and accompanying text.
44. Cannon, 398 F. Supp. at 215; JUDICIAL RESPONSE, supra note 42, at VII. 10
The issue most frequently arises when plaintiff-shareholders challenge the adequacy of
the corporation's representation. At least one court has questioned a shareholder's stand-
ing to object to the corporation's choice of counsel. Otis, 57 F. Supp. at 684; see infra
notes 64-68 and accompanying text. As noted by one commentator, however, such a bar
should not be imposed. Prohibiting the shareholder's objection is tantamount to permit-
ting multiple representation in all such cases, because the individual director-officer de-
fendants will not object to corporate counsel representing their individual interests.
Comment, supra note 13, at 526 n.16.
45. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
46. L. GILBERT & G. ZADOROZNY, SERVING Two MASTERS: THE LAW OF LAW-
YER DISQUALIFICATION 5 (1984). This section of the note will, in order to highlight
various approaches, focus upon federal circuit court decisions. For cases involving the
balancing of these two policies, see Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instrument Co., 689
F.2d 715, 721 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. Hobson, 672 F.2d 825, 828 (11th Cir.
1982); United States v. Miller, 624 F.2d 1198, 1201 (3d Cir. 1980) (the attorney's ability
to practice without excessive restrictions must be considered also); Meat Price Investiga-
tors Ass'n v. Spencer Foods, Inc., 572 F.2d 163, 165 (8th Cir. 1978); Government of
India v. Cook Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1978); Woods v. Covington County
Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 810 (5th Cir. 1976); Waterbury Garment Corp. v. Strata Prods.,
Inc., 554 F. Supp. 63, 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (an additional consideration is the defendant's
right to untainted representation); In re Asbestos Cases, 514 F. Supp. 914, 925 (E.D. Va.
1981); In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litig., 470 F. Supp. 495, 502 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
47. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
48. L. GILBERT & G. ZADOROZNY, supra note 46, at 6. For cases involving the
Canon 5 test, see Melamed v. ITT Continental Baking Company, 592 F.2d 290 (6th Cir.
1979); IBM v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271 (3d. Cir. 1978) (disqualification mandated by DR 5-
105 and Canon 9 an additional factor); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr McGee Corp.,
580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978); Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co. v.
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unless the attorney can demonstrate that the multiple representa-
tion will neither diminish the vigor of his representation nor lead to
actual or apparent conflict.4 9 Both of these tests focus upon the
client's strong interest in adequate representation. °
Canon 9 of the Model Code,5 ' with its emphasis upon mainte-
nance of public trust in the integrity of the judicial system and the
legal profession,5 2 has been invoked by some courts as additional
authority for resolving existing doubts against the propriety of
multiple representation. 3 A strong minority of federai courts re-
United States, 570 F.2d 1197 (4th Cir.), cert. denied., 439 U.S. 821 (1978); Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Daniel Int'l Corp., 563 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1977); Black v.
State of Mo., 492 F. Supp. 848 (W.D. Mo. 1980); International Union v. Allis Chalmers
Corp., 447 F. Supp. 766 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
A Ninth Circuit case, In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. An-
titrust Litig., 658 F.2d. 1355, 1359 (9th Cir. 1981), reflects application of Rule 5-102(B)
of the Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of California, which provides that
conflicting interests should not be represented except where the consent of all parties is
obtained. The California Rules provide that the Model Code should be referred to in the
absence of relevant state code provisions.
49. Cinema-5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1387 (2d. Cir. 1976). The stan-
dard of Cinema-5 is considered the leading case in concurrent representation. JUDICIAL
RESPONSE, supra note 42, at VII.4. The standard has been applied in other Second Cir-
cuit cases. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241 (2d Cir. 1979) (disqualifi-
cation order reversed where court found no risk that lawyer's loyalty to his clients would
be diminished); Glueck v. Jonathan Logan, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 223 (S.D.N.Y.) (Cinema-5
standard should be applied to suits against trade association members only when the
dangers against which Canons 4 and 9 were designed to protect are compromised), afl'd,
653 F.2d 746 (2d Cir. 1981); Sapienza v. New York News, Inc., 481 F. Supp. 676
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (disqualification warranted where same attorney represented two clients
directly opposing each other in litigation); Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen &
Co., 435 F. Supp. 84 (S.D.N.Y.) (Cinema-5 test applied where case involved simultaneous
representation of clients with potentially conflicting interests), afl'd in part, rev'd in part,
567 F.2d 225 (2d Cir. 1977).
Other circuits have applied the Cinema-5 test. See IBM v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271 (3d
Cir. 1978) (upholding a disqualification order, court relied heavily on the likelihood of
conflict and on the fact that the attorney did not attempt to obtain full client consent);
Unified Sewerage Agency v. Jelco, Inc., 646 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1981) (representation
found adequate where litigation in the two cases was quite different).
50. L. GILBERT & G. ZADOROZNY, supra note 46, at 6-7.
51. Canon 9 provides that "A lawyer should avoid even the appearance of impropri-
ety." MODEL CODE Canon 9.
52. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
53. The Second Circuit views Canon 9 as a rule that is a relevant factor when other
Canons are violated but which does not alone suffice as grounds for disqualification.
Cheng v. GAF Corp., 631 F.2d 1052, 1058-59 (2d Cir. 1980) ("where there is no danger
that the underlying trial will be tainted, appearances of impropriety alone are insufficient
to justify disqualification"), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 450 U.S. 903 (1981);
Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 446 (2d Cir. 1980) ("there may be unusual situa-
tions where the appearance of impropriety alone is sufficient to warrant disqualifica-
tion"), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981); Silver Chrysler
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ject application of this standard,54 particularly where violations of
other Canons are not found, 5 but Canon 9 is still a criterion for
ethical analysis in a majority of the circuits.5 6
Courts have become increasingly flexible and equitable in deal-
ing with conflict of interest cases.57 In recent years, the judiciary
Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 757 (2d Cir. 1975) (Canon 9
dictates that any doubts be resolved in favor of disqualification).
The Third Circuit, in IBM v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 283 (3d Cir. 1978), found disqualifi-
cation mandated by DR 5-105, and found Canon 9 to be an important additional factor in
determining appropriate sanctions for violations of other Code provisions. See also
United States v. Miller, 624 F.2d 1198, 1203 (3d Cir. 1980) (disqualification under Canon
9 necessary where attorney has conflict of interest or has shared confidential information
with a partner).
The Fourth Circuit has held that while a Canon 9 violation may itself mandate disqual-
ification, "[i]t cannot be a fanciful, unrealistic or purely subjective suspicion of impropri-
ety that requires disqualification. The appearance of impropriety must be real." United
States v. Smith, 653 F.2d 126, 128 (4th Cir. 1981).
The Fifth Circuit applies a two-pronged test to determine whether Canon 9 provides a
basis for disqualification. First, the movant must show that there is a reasonable possibil-
ity that the appearance of impropriety will occur. Second, the likelihood of public suspi-
cion must outweigh the client's interest in obtaining freely chosen counsel. In re
Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 659 F.2d 1341, 1345 (5th Cir. 1981).
While the Sixth Circuit has not specifically addressed the issue, a district court deci-
sion, Lee v. Todd, 555 F. Supp. 628, 631-32 (W.D. Tenn. 1982), is in accord with the
Fifth Circuit position.
The Seventh Circuit rejects Canon 9 as the sole basis for disqualification. In Freeman
v. Chicago Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715, 723 (7th Cir. 1982), the court held
that "[t]he possible appearance of impropriety.., is simply too weak and slender a reed
on which to rest a disqualification order in this case, particularly where the mere appear-
ance of impropriety is far from clear."
The Eighth Circuit has held that Canon 9 may, by itself, mandate disqualification. In
State of Ark. v. Dean Food Prods. Co., Inc., 605 F.2d 380 (8th Cir. 1979), the court held
that where supervising counsel had been disqualified pursuant to Canons 4 and 9, coun-
sel's staff lawyers must be disqualified under Canon 9. The court noted that the essential
question is whether a member of the public, or the bar, would perceive an impropriety in
the representation. Id. at 385.
The Ninth Circuit views Canon 9 as normally insufficient to mandate disqualification.
United Sewerage Agency v. Jelco, Inc., 646 F.2d 1339, 1352 (9th Cir. 1981) ("We do not
believe Canon 9 was intended to override the delicate balance created by Canon 5 and the
decisions thereunder."), while a district court in the Tenth Circuit, citing Second Circuit
decisions, has held that disqualification "is indicated where the offending attorney's con-
duct threatens to 'taint the underlying trial' with a serious ethical violation." Field v.
Freeman, 527 F. Supp. 935, 940 (D. Kan. 1981).
The Eleventh Circuit has applied the Fifth Circuit's two-pronged test for Canon 9
disqualification. United States v. Hobson, 672 F.2d 825 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
906 (1982).
54. JUDICIAL RESPONSE, supra note 42, at VII.6.
55. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 444 (2d Cir. 1980) (court adopted
"a restrained approach to disqualification"), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 449
U.S. 1106 (1981); United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 96 N.M. 155, 629 P.2d
231 (1980) (violation of professional ethics does not automatically result in disqualifica-
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has developed an evaluative process which focuses upon the partic-
ular facts and surrounding circumstances of each case in order to
strike the appropriate balance between the right to choice of coun-
sel and preservation of the highest ethical standards. 8
Judicial Treatment of Multiple Representation in Derivative Suits
The ethical propriety of multiple representation of a corporation
and its directors or officers is an issue which has resulted in a split
of authority among the courts. While several older cases permitted
multiple representation, 59 the more recent trend, in sharp contrast
to that developing in non-derivative conflict cases,6" is to require
the corporation to retain independent counsel.61
Much discussion regarding the propriety of multiple representa-
tion has involved the nature of the wrongdoings with which the
individual director-officer defendants are charged. It has been held
that where the individual defendants have been charged with fraud
against the corporation, the interests of the corporation and the
individuals are wholly divergent and joint representation is not in
the best interests of the parties.62 Where the complaint charges
negligence rather than fraud or illegality, the propriety of joint rep-
resentation may be more difficult to ascertain.63 In Otis & Co. v.
tion; a motion to disqualify counsel is of an equitable nature.); JUDICIAL RESPONSE,
supra note 42, at VII.6.
58. JUDICIAL RESPONSE, supra note 42, at VII.10.
59. See, e.g., Selama-Dindings Plantation, Ltd. v. Durham, 216 F. Supp. 104 (S.D.
Ohio 1963) (joint representation upheld absent express showing of conflict of interest or
breach of trust), aif'd, 337 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1964); Otis, 57 F. Supp. at 684; see also
Hausman v. Buckley, 299 F.2d 696 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 885 (1962). The
Hausman court, in a derivative action on behalf of a Venezuelan corporation, held that
under applicable conflict of law rules, Venezuelan law which required that actions be
brought as the result of shareholder meetings operated as a bar to the action. Conse-
quently, dual representation of the corporation and the individual defendants was permis-
sible as they shared a common interest in seeing that the shareholders' meeting occurred.
60. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
61. See, e.g., Murphy v. Washington Am. League Base Ball Club, Inc., 324 F.2d 394,
398 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Cannon, 398 F. Supp. at 220; Lewis v. Shaffer Stores Co., 218 F.
Supp. 238, 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). While an alternative solution might be to require indi-
vidual defendants to obtain independent counsel, this procedure could, as noted by one
commentator, fail to remove the substance of the problem where corporate counsel's
judgment continues to be undermined by loyalties to directors and officers with whom he
has closely worked. See Comment, supra note 13, at 533.
62. Yablonski v. United Mineworkers of Am., 448 F.2d 1175, 1180, enforced per
curiam, 454 F.2d 1036 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied., 406 U.S. 906 (1971); Messing v. F.D.I.,
Inc., 439 F. Supp. 776, 783 (D.N.J. 1977); Cannon, 398 F. Supp. at 220; Lewis v. Shaffer
Stores Co., 218 F. Supp. 238, 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Otis, 57 F. Supp. at 684; 13 W.
FLETCHER, supra note 9, at § 6025.
63. See infra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
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Pennsylvania R.R., 64 a 1944 decision which reflects early judicial
reluctance to interfere with a corporation's choice of counsel,
plaintiff-shareholders alleged that the defendant officers breached
their fiduciary duty to the corporation by failing to "shop around"
for the best obtainable price on a new bond issue.65 The Otis court
denied plaintiffs' request that joint counsel be removed because of
conflicting interests.66 In so doing, the court inferred a distinction
between suits involving fraud and those involving negligence.67
Joint representation was held to be permissible where plaintiffs did
not allege breach of confidence or trust by individual defendants.68
In a more recent decision, one court in dicta rejected the negli-
gence/fraud distinction, stating that the interests of the corpora-
tion and the individual defendants are diverse regardless of the
nature of the charges.6 9
Courts have often pointed to the corporation's active or passive
stance as an important factor in determining whether multiple rep-
resentation should be permitted.7 0 The Association of the City of
New York Committee on Professional Ethics has also looked to
this factor, recognizing that under particular circumstances joint
representation may be permitted when the corporate role is pas-
sive.7' This distinction, like the negligence/fraud distinction, has,
however, been rejected by some authorities because the corpora-
tion's decision as to what stance it will take may itself be tainted,
64. 57 F. Supp. 680 (E.D. Pa. 1944), affid per curiam, 155 F.2d 522 (3d Cir. 1946).
65. Id. at 682.
66. Id. at 684.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Messing v. F.D.I., Inc., 439 F. Supp. 776, 782 (D.N.J. 1977). In Messing, plain-
tiffs charged violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, predicated on the alleged
fraud of some directors and the alleged negligence of others. Pendent state claims
charged negligence, fraud, waste, and breach of fiduciary duty. The corporation took an
active role by asserting a cross claim. The court, under these facts, confined its holding to
the statement that, when the directors have been accused of fraud and the corporation
has elected to take an active role in the litigation, the corporation must retain independ-
ent counsel. Id. at 782.
Other courts have also prohibited joint representation when directors are accused of
fraud. See, e.g., Neidermeyer v. Neidermeyer, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,123 (D.
Or. 1973); Rowen v. Lemars Mut. Ins. Co. of Iowa, 230 N.W.2d 905 (Iowa 1975); see
infra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
70. See, e.g., Clark v. Lomas & Nettleton, 79 F.R.D. 658 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (dual
representation permissible where joint counsel initially files motion to dismiss on behalf of
the corporation and individual defendants); Garlen v. Green Mansions, Inc., 9 A.D.2d
760, 193 N.Y.S.2d 116 (when relief sought requires active appearance and answer by
corporation, independent counsel must make appearance), rearg denied, 10 A.D.2d 557,
196 N.Y.S.2d 593 (1959).
71. Ass'n of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 842 (1960).
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absent independent counsel, by the existence of conflict of
interest. 72
Analysis of a derivative action, from the corporation's perspec-
tive, involves an evaluation of the merits of the case and the litiga-
tion role to be assumed by the corporation.73 Whether multiple
representation and its potential for conflict of interest impair the
objectivity of this analysis has been the subject of some dispute.
Defense counsel have frequently argued, when faced with a motion
for disqualification at an early point in the proceedings, that such
motion is premature, that the plaintiff's complaint is without merit,
and that counsel will immediately withdraw should an actual con-
flict arise.74 This argument was rejected in a 1975 decision, Rowen
v. LeMars Mutual Insurance Co. 75 In Rowen, policyholders sued a
corporate insurer and alleged corporate insiders following the sale
of a controlling interest in one corporation. The derivative action
alleged bribery in connection with the sale, breach of fiduciary
duty, and waste of corporate assets.76 The court, rejecting the con-
tention that disqualification must be based upon an actual conflict
of interest rather than a potential one,77 found a conflict sufficient
to require disqualification. 8 It held that where management of the
corporation rests in the hands of implicated directors and officers,
independent counsel must be obtained to ensure the objectivity of
analysis of the merits of the action.79
The Rowen approach is similar to that taken by several other
courts. 0 Some commentators believe that these decisions reflect
72. Messing, 439 F.Supp. at 782; Rowen v. Lemars Mut. Ins. Co., 230 N.W.2d 905,
915 (Iowa 1975).
73. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
74. See, e.g., Cannon, 398 F. Supp. at 214.
75. 230 N.W.2d 905 (Iowa 1975).
76. Id. at 908.
77. Id. at 915.
78. Id.
79. Id. Commentators are in accord with the Rowen position that joint representa-
tion may prevent fair inquiry into the merits of the action. See, e.g., Comment, supra
note 13, at 531; Note, supra note 14, at 349.
80. See, e.g., Yablonski v. United Mineworkers of Am., 448 F.2d 1175, enforced per
curiam, 454 F.2d 1036 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1971); Murphy v. Wash-
ington Am. League Base Ball Club, Inc., 324 F.2d 394 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (where union
officers were charged with diversion of funds, the law firm which regularly represented
the union and which entered appearances for both the union and the officers was not
permitted to continue joint representation); Lewis v. Shaffer Stores Co., 218 F. Supp. 238
(S.D.N.Y. 1963) (corporation and individual defendants must be separately represented
when complaint charged unlawful misconduct on part of individual defendants); Essen-
tial Enterprises Corp. v. Dorsey Corp., 60 Del. Ch. 343, 182 A.2d 647 (1962) (same firm
not permitted to represent corporate and individual defendants; independent counsel for
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increasing judicial opposition to multiple representation."' For ex-
ample, in Cannon v. U.S. Acoustics Corp.,82 a 1975 decision, share-
holders sought recovery for alleged misappropriation of corporate
funds as well as violations of federal and state securities laws. 3 The
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois concluded that
the same counsel could not represent both the corporation and the
individual defendants when the complaint on its face established a
conflict of interest.8 4 The court conceded that the decision in-
fringed upon the corporation's right to choice of counsel and in-
creased the corporation's financial burden, 5 but it found that such
concerns were outweighed by the possibility of conflict of inter-
est."6 By contrast, in Clark v. Lomas & Nettleton s 7 a 1978 deci-
sion, the court declined to follow Cannon, finding no conflict of
interest where joint defense counsel initially filed a motion to dis-
miss on behalf of both the corporation and the individual defend-
ants and did not otherwise participate in the lawsuit.88  The Clark
court held that absent a showing of existence of actual conflict of
interest, the client's right to choice of counsel outweighs a potential
conflict.8 9
Although cases such as Cannon reveal increasing judicial aware-
ness of the potential ethical problems involved with multiple repre-
sentation in derivative suits,9° this trend has not led to a uniform
position among the courts.9' While several recent decisions have
corporation required); In re Conduct of Kinsey, 294 Or. 544, 660 P.2d 660 (1983) (dual
representation impermissible where potential conflict existed); see infra notes 82-86 and
accompanying text.
81. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 13, at 531; Note, supra note 14, at 349.
82. 398 F. Supp. 209 (N.D. Ill. 1975), affid in part, rev'd in part, 532 F.2d 1118 (7th
Cir. 1976).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 220.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. 79 F.R.D. 658 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
88. Id. at 661.
89. Id.
90. See, e.g., In re Conduct of Kinsey, 294 Or. 544, 561, 660 P.2d 660, 669 (1983)
(joint counsel must withdraw "unless the claim is patently sham or patently frivolous").
Emerging judicial condemnation of dual representation also appears in suits under §
501 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. § 501 (1982).
Under this section, union members may sue the union and its officers for breach of fiduci-
ary duty, and any recovery inures to the union. Several cases require that independent
counsel be appointed when there exists a potential conflict between the interests of the
union and those of accused officers. Weaver v. United Mineworkers of Am., 492 F.2d
580, 583 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Yablonski, 448 F.2d at 1180; Tucker v. Shaw, 378 F.2d 304,
307-08 (2d Cir. 1967).
91. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text regarding the Clark decision.
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followed Cannon by imposing what amounts to a per se disqualifi-
cation rule, 92 and while commentators have taken the broad view
that the corporation should always be independently represented in
a derivative action,93 the practice of multiple representation contin-
ues,94 as does its acceptance by the courts in particular factual set-
tings as exemplified by Clark.95
DISCUSSION
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct
In view of the continuing split of authority regarding the propri-
ety of multiple representation, the recently adopted Model Rules of
Professional Conduct96 offer valuable guidance as to the appropri-
Other courts have also permitted dual representation. Jacuzzi v. Jacuzzi Bros., Inc., 243
Cal. App. 2d 1, 15, 52 Cal. Rptr. 147, 171 (1966) ("In general ... prior to an adjudica-
tion that the corporation is entitled to relief against its officers or directors, the same
attorney may represent both."); Hutchison v. Woodstock Community School Dist. No.
200, 66 Ill. App. 3d 307, 384 N.E.2d 382 (1978) (any conflict of interest arising from
attorney's joint representation of school board, its members and superintendent was
solely a matter for the aggrieved parties, not opposing counsel, as an attorney can repre-
sent divergent interests if his clients do not object).
92. Messing, 439 F. Supp. at 782; In re Conduct of Kinsey, 294 Or. 544, 561, 660
P.2d 660, 669 (1983).
93. See, e.g., H. HENN, supra note 1, at 1082. See generally Comment, supra note 13;
Note, supra note 14.
94. It is impossible to accurately determine how frequently the practice occurs, but
repeated references to the issue by commentators provide inferential evidence that the
practice is not rare. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 13, at 524.
95. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
96. Since the ABA's adoption of the Model Rules in 1983, virtually every state
supreme court or bar association has established a committee charged with considering
adoption of the Model Rules. ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCT 17 (1985). As of this writing, the supreme courts of Arizona and New Jersey have
adopted new ethical codes based on the Model Rules, and at least seven other states have
recommended adoption of the Model Rules. While the adopted and proposed codes con-
tain certain amendments to the Model Rules, largely concerning certain confidentiality
and advertising provisions, the amendments do not concern the conflict of interest provi-
sions discussed here. Id. at 17, 70-71, 191, 237, 264, 306, 334, 445, 534.
On May 17, 1984, the United States Court of Claims adopted the Model Rules verba-
tim. Id. at 240.
The Model Rules are written in a directive, restatement format rather than the regula-
tory format of the Model Code. The Preamble to the Model Rules describes their scope
as follows:
The Rules of Professional Conduct are rules of reason. They should be inter-
preted with reference to the purposes of legal representation and of the law
itself. Some of the Rules are imperatives, cast in the terms "shall" or "shall
not". These define proper conduct for purposes of professional discipline.
Others, generally cast in the term "may", are permissive and define areas under
the Rules in which the lawyer has professional discretion. No disciplinary ac-
tion should be taken when the lawyer chooses not to act or acts within the
bounds of such discretion. Other Rules define the nature of relationships be-
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ate resolution of the issue. The Model Rules are similar to the
Model Code in that they recognize that the corporate counsel's
foremost loyalty must run to the corporate entity itself.97 Further,
the Model Rules articulate specifically what the Model Code im-
plies, that is, that a lawyer representing the corporation may at
times represent its individual constituents if consent is obtained. 98
The consent must be given by a corporate representative other than
the official who is being represented, or by the shareholders. 99
Unlike the Model Code, however, the Model Rules address the
issue of representation in derivative suits. Comment 12 to Rule
1.13 indicates that the corporation's attorney may defend deriva-
tive suits because such suits are an ordinary incident of a corpora-
tion's conduct of business. ° The comment cautions, however,
that some derivative suits may engender a conflict between duty to
the corporation and loyalty to directors.' ° Should such a conflict
arise, the comment suggests that Model Rule 1.7 govern whether
representation by corporate counsel may continue. 102
Rule 1.7 sets forth the general standard to be applied in deter-
mining whether conflicts of interest preclude representation. The
rule provides that a lawyer shall not represent clients with conflict-
ing interests, or clients whose representation may be limited by the
tween the lawyer and others. The Rules are thus partly obligatory and discipli-
nary and partly constitutive and descriptive in that they define a lawyer's
professional role. Many of the Comments use the term "should". Comments
do not add obligations to the Rules but provide guidance for practicing in com-
pliance with the Rules.
MODEL RULES Preamble (1983).
97. MODEL RULES Rule 1.13. The rule provides: "A lawyer employed or retained
by an organization represents the organization acting through its duly authorized
constituents."
98. Id. Part (e) provides:
A lawyer representing an organization may also represent any of its directors,
officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, subject to the
provisions of Rule 1.7. If the organization's consent to the dual representation
is required by Rule 1.7, the consent shall be given by an appropriate official of
the organization other than the individual who is to be represented, or by the
shareholders.
MODEL RULES Rule 1.13(e). For a discussion of Rule 1.7, see infra note 103 and accom-
panying text. See supra note 37 and accompanying text for the Model Code provision
regarding client consent to multiple representation.
99. MODEL RULES Rule 1.13.
100. Id. comment 12. The focus upon the particular problems which arise in deriva-
tive suits is typical of the restatement format of the Model Rules by which they address
specifically issues addressed only indirectly by the Model Code. ABA/BNA LAWYERS'
MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 70-71 (1985).
101. MODEL RULES Rule 1.13 comment 12.
102. Id.
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lawyer's responsibilities to another, unless the lawyer reasonably
believes that the quality of the representation will not be adversely
affected and unless the client consents after consultation. 103
The Model Rules require an attorney contemplating dual repre-
sentation in any setting, including a derivative action, to examine
the facts and circumstances in order to determine whether divided
loyalties might impair the quality of representation." If counsel
believes that multiple representation will not engender a conflict,
the client then must examine the relevant facts and circumstances
and determine whether multiple representation is compatible with
its best interests. 105
The drafters of the Model Rules have thus rejected a per se pro-
hibition against multiple representation in derivative suits, adopt-
ing instead an ethical standard which focuses not upon the unique
attributes of derivative actions but, rather, upon the ethical consid-
erations which accompany any representation involving potential
conflicts of interest. A case-by-case analysis such as that proposed
103. MODEL RULES Rule 1.7.
Participants in the 1984 BNA Conference on Legal Ethics noted that there is not a
significant amount of difference between the Model Code and the Model Rules in the
conflicts area. The Model Rules, rather than attempting to change the conflicts law,
merely try to encompass the case law developed under or "in spite of' the Model Code.
ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT at 119-20.
The Model Code comparison published by the ABA in conjunction with the Model
Rules notes that:
Rule 1.7 clarifies DR 5-105(A) by requiring that, when the lawyer's other
interests are involved, not only must the client consent after consultation but
also that, independent of such consent, the representation reasonably appears
not to be adversely affected by the lawyer's other interests. This requirement
appears to be the intended meaning of the provision in DR 5-105(c) that "it is
obvious that he can adequately represent" the client, and was implicit in EC 5-
2, which stated that a lawyer "should not accept proffered employment if his
personal interests or desires will, or there is a reasonable probability that they
will, affect adversely the advice to be given or service to be rendered the pro-
spective client."
MODEL RULES Model Code Comparison to Rule 1.7 (1983).
104. The comment to Rule 1.7 provides that:
A possible conflict does not itself preclude the representation. The critical ques-
tions are the likelihood that a conflict will eventuate and, if it does, whether it
will materially interfere with the lawyer's independent professional judgment in
considering alternatives or foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be
pursued on behalf of the client.
MODEL RULES Rule 1.7 comment (1983).
105. The comment to Rule 1.7 provides:
[W]hen a disinterested lawyer would conclude that the client should not agree
to the representation under the circumstances, the lawyer involved cannot prop-
erly ask for such agreement or provide representation on the basis of the client's
consent. When more than one client is involved, the question of conflict must
be resolved as to each client.
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by the Model Rules provides a vehicle whereby bar and bench can
address the ethical concerns which have prompted many disqualifi-
cations while simultaneously addressing the practical realities of
corporate practice which underlie many multiple representation
decisions.
ANALYSIS
Evaluation of the propriety of multiple representation involves
the preservation of a delicate balance between the right to freely
chosen counsel and the need to maintain the highest ethical stan-
dards. 06 The danger that divided attorney loyalties might threaten
the corporation's interests must be weighed along with other, pos-
sibly conflicting considerations. Among these are the corporation's
interest in being represented by long-retained and trusted counsel,
the significant expense involved in substituting counsel, and the
preservation of the corporation as a self-governing entity. 107 The
balance must be maintained in order to preserve public trust in the
integrity of the bar and to protect the interests of clients. 08
The Efficacy of the Case-by-Case Approach
In attempting to strike the appropriate balance between ethical
standards and corporate choice of counsel, it is useful to recall one
judge's admonition that consideration of ethical principles requires
a painstaking analysis of facts and careful application of precedent
rather than a sweeping broad-strokes approach.0 9 The relation-
ships and interests present in the corporate setting are so complex
and so varied 10 that an optimal balancing of interests may not ap-
propriately be reduced to a set of mechanical rules. There is in the
nature of derivative suits nothing which renders such cases inap-
propriate vehicles for the flexible analysis used in other conflicts
cases."' Indeed, broad-strokes approaches such as those found in
106. Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 564-65 (2d Cir. 1973); see
supra note 46 and accompanying text.
107. See infra notes 109-23 and accompanying text.
108. Emle Indus., 478 F.2d at 564-65.
109. In United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) the
court stated:
When dealing with ethical principles . . . we cannot paint with broad
strokes. The lines are fine and must be so marked. Guideposts can be estab-
lished when virgin ground is being explored, and the conclusion in a particular
case can be reached only after a painstaking analysis of the facts and precise
application of precedent.
110. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
S11. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
1985]
Loyola University Law Journal
Rowen" 2 and Cannon' 13 seem particularly incompatible with the
multiplicity of factual patterns underlying derivative actions.
In addition, in contrast to a per se rule, the case-by-case ap-
proach reflects a sensitivity to the harsh consequences of attorney
disqualification. The main burden of disqualification rests upon
the corporation, which loses the counsel of its choice. 1 4 This loss,
and the reduction of corporate autonomy which accompanies it,
should be avoided whenever possible. 115 On a more practical level,
the corporation also loses an attorney who is familiar with both the
clients and the case.1 16
Disqualification of corporate counsel involves significant time
and expense spent in preparing a new attorney," 7 and in some
cases the quality of representation by the new attorney may never
equal that offered by experienced corporate counsel."' Disqualifi-
cation of counsel also imposes harsh consequences upon the attor-
ney. The transaction being challenged may result in part from the
attorney's contribution to the corporate decision-making process.
If disqualified from representing the corporation, he therefore loses
both a client and the opportunity to defend his work and advice. 119
A flexible facts and circumstances approach limits the settings in
which disqualification will be mandated, thereby diminishing the
potential for abuse and the increase in volume of disqualification
motions. 2 ° It is widely recognized that disqualification motions
are often interposed for tactical reasons;' a litigation tactic dis-
guised as a motion for disqualification unfairly burdens the clients,
112. 230 N.W. 2d 905 (Iowa 1975); see supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
113. 398 F. Supp. 209 (N.D. I11. 1975), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 532 F.2d 1118 (7th
Cir. 1976); see supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
114. JUDICIAL RESPONSE, supra note 42, at VII.6.
115. Non-recognition of corporate autonomy is inconsistent with the long-recognized
theory of the corporation as an independent legal entity. See H. HENN, supra note 1, at
16.
116. JUDICIAL RESPONSE, supra note 42, at VII.6.
117. E.g., Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1982).
118. JUDICIAL RESPONSE, supra note 42, at VII.6; Freeman, 689 F.2d at 719-20.
"[I]t may also be difficult, if not impossible, for a new attorney to master the nuances of
the legal and factual matters late in the litigation of a complex case." Id. (quoting Com-
ment, The Availability of the Work Product of a Disqualified Attorney: What Standard?,
127 U. PA. L. REV. 1607, 1608 n.12 (1979)).
119. JUDICIAL RESPONSE, supra note 42, at VII.7; Shipman, supra note 20, at 271.
120. See JUDICIAL RESPONSE, supra note 42, at VII.7.
121. Board of Educ. of N.Y. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir. 1979). Because
of the potential for abuse, courts carefully consider the timeliness of disqualification mo-
tions, and even otherwise-valid motions may be denied if the plaintiff has waited an un-
reasonable time. See, e.g., United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 96 N.M. 155,
629 P.2d 231 (1980).
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the attorneys, and the judicial process."' Furthermore, disqualifi-
cation motions, even when made in good faith, inevitably generate
delay and increased expense. 23
In any derivative suit, the corporation's desire to retain trusted
counsel must be balanced against the danger that divided attorney
loyalties could threaten the corporation's interests. The goal of
achieving the proper balance may be attained only if particular
facts and circumstances are carefully evaluated in an analysis of
whether corporate and individual defendant interests are common
or divergent.
Application of the Case-by-Case Approach
Analysis of the propriety of multiple representation must begin
with establishment of a mechanism whereby the merits of the case
may be objectively evaluated and consent to dual representation
given in a non-illusory manner. Once this threshold step has been
taken, Model Rule 1.7 provides a guideline for flexible analysis by
requiring the attorney, faced with a potential conflict of interest, to
determine whether he reasonably believes that his representation
will not be adversely affected, and to inform his clients of the po-
tential ramifications of joint representation. If counsel believes
that effective representation may continue, and if the consent of the
corporation is freely given, multiple representation may occur.
Should potential conflict outweigh the corporation's right to choice
of counsel, the corporations's board of directors must select in-
dependent counsel.
Preserving the Objectivity of Consent and Evaluation
Rule 1.7 of the Model Rules 2 4 provides an excellent guideline
for analysis of the factual setting accompanying a derivative action.
Under the rule, an attorney contemplating multiple representation
must first examine the circumstances to determine whether ethical
conflicts preclude the representation.1 25 Significant factors in the
attorney's analysis will include the composition of the board of di-
122. JUDICIAL RESPONSE, supra note 42, at VII.7.
123. Id. The degree of expense and delay potentially involved is exemplified by West-
inghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978), in which
attorneys were disqualified after 2.5 million dollars in attorney fees had been incurred. In
Emle Indus., disqualification motions delayed proceedings for three years. 478 F.2d at
574.
124. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
125. Id.
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rectors, 126 the extent to which the board is allegedly implicated in
the wrongdoings charged, the period of time for which the attorney
has worked with management, and similar factors which reflect the
degree to which the attorney's actions may be influenced by loyalty
to the directors. 127 The attorney must also examine the nature of
the charges and the corporation's anticipated role in the litiga-
tion. 2 8 Under Rule 1.7, a review of the circumstances must also be
made by the corporation and the individual defendants. 129 If de-
fendants consent after full consultation regarding the possible
ramifications, 130 multiple representation may continue. 3 1
Some commentators have questioned the applicability of a con-
sent rationale to derivative suits in view of the fact that consent to
multiple representation frequently comes from the directors who
are the individual defendants. 132 While some caution may be war-
ranted, 133 consent to dual representation may nonetheless play an
important role in some derivative actions. Should the board be
comprised, at least in part, of independent non-defendant directors,
such directors may, after receiving from counsel full disclosure of
the potential ramifications of joint representation, be able to con-
vey the entity's non-illusory consent to such representation. 3 1
Model Rule 1.13 is in accord with this view, specifically providing
that consent to representation by corporate counsel of other corpo-
rate constituents may be given by a non-implicated corporate offi-
cial. 35 Rule 1.13 provides another avenue to effective consent by
permitting consent to be given by shareholder vote. 136 If, however,
effective consent cannot be obtained by either of these methods,
independent counsel for the corporation must be retained in order
126. Whether the board is composed largely of insiders or outsiders may, for exam-
ple, be a factor.
127. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
128. The comment to Model Rules Rules 1.13 states that "if the [derivative] claim
involves serious charges of wrongdoing by those in control of the organization, a conflict
may arise between the lawyer's duty to the organization and the lawyer's relationship
with the board." MODEL RULES Rule 1.13 comment.
129. MODEL RULES Rule 1.7.
130. Id; see supra note 105 and accompanying text.
131. MODEL RULES Rule 1.7.
132. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 13, at 528; see supra notes 17-19 and accompany-
ing text.
133. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text for a discussion of corporate rela-
tionships which affect the consent issue.
134. McAlinden v. Wiggins, 543 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
135. MODEL RULES Rule 1.13.
136. Id. Presumably, shareholders who are also defendants cannot take part in giv-
ing consent.
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to maintain ethical standards.137
Closely aligned with the issue of the efficacy of corporate consent
is the issue of the objectivity of corporate determination regarding
the merits of a derivative suit and the position the corporation
should assume in the litigation. The Rowen court held that dual
representation prevents fair inquiry into the merits of the action.' 38
This holding fails to consider an essential factor: the independence
and composition of the board of directors. A unanimously impli-
cated board, guided by corporate counsel long affiliated with and
loyal to that board, may indeed be unable to reach an objective
conclusion regarding the merits of the action. A board which is
comprised at least in part of unimplicated directors may, however,
be entirely capable of making a reasoned determination untainted
by self-interest and conflict. 39
The Rowen court's reasoning is clearly inconsistent with judicial
holdings which have upheld the decisions of independent litigation
committees.140 Such decisions recognize the fact that defendant
corporations are capable of reaching objective conclusions regard-
ing the merits of derivative actions. 14 ' Formation of an independ-
ent litigation committee, and injection of independent counsel into
the evaluative stage of the derivative action where needed, provide
a mechanism whereby the objectivity of the corporation's analysis
of the action may be ensured. Since preservation of this objectivity
was an important factor in Rowen, 142 Cannon, 43 and other deci-
sions which ordered disqualification of corporate counsel, 144 use of
the committee appears to eliminate a major obstacle to multiple
representation. The procedure thus protects the need for objective
evaluation while also protecting the corporation's right to retain
traditional counsel for the proceedings which follow the commit-
tee's decision. '4
137. MODEL RULES Rule 1.7.
138. 230 N.W.2d 905, 915 (Iowa 1975); see supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
139. See infra notes 140-45 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
141. See, e.g., Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1981); Watts v. Des
Moines Register & Tribune, 525 F. Supp. 1311 (S.D. Iowa 1981); Gall v. Exxon Corp.,
418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
142. 230 N.W.2d 905 (Iowa 1975); see supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
143. 398 F. Supp. 209 (N.D. 1Il. 1975), ajf'd in part, rev'd in part, 532 F.2d 1118 (7th
Cir. 1976); see supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
144. See, e.g., Murphy v. Washington Am. League Base Ball Club, Inc., 324 F.2d
394, 398 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Lewis v. Shafer Stores Co., 218 F. Supp. 238, 240 (S.D.N.Y.
1963).
145. This avoids the delay, expense and inadequacy of representation often encoun-
tered when disqualification is mandated. See supra notes 114-19 and accompanying text.
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Evaluation of Potential Conflicts
It is essential that the corporation develop an independent proce-
dure whereby the merits of the case may be objectively determined
and consent to multiple representation freely given. This threshold
step is, however, merely the beginning of analysis of the propriety
of multiple representation. Once the merits of the suit have been
evaluated and the corporation's position in the litigation deter-
mined, corporate counsel and either an independent board quorum
or the shareholders must, consistent with Model Rule 1.7,146 deter-
mine whether the interests of the corporate defendant and the indi-
vidual defendants are common or divergent. Key factors to be
carefully evaluated include the nature of the charges, the role of
the corporation, and the stage of the litigation. 147 Should the inter-
ests be so divergent that a conflict of interest appears likely to arise,
the attorney should decline the multiple representation immedi-
ately in order to avoid an expensive, time-consuming substitution
of counsel at a later stage in the litigation. 148 In view of the impor-
tance of adhering to ethical standards, any doubts should be re-
solved against the propriety of the representation.1 49
While the strength of the Model Rules approach lies in its flexi-
bility and its emphasis upon the particular circumstances of each
case, 150 it is possible to identify certain factual patterns which have
played a major role in past court decisions and which should play a
significant role in future analyses under Rule 1.7. The presence or
absence of these patterns may point to the unity or divergence of
the interests present.
A classic example of a derivative action in which the defendants
have unanimity of interest is the strike suit. 51 Where the suit is
patently without merit, the interests of all defendants are unified
because all are concerned with terminating a meritless suit which
involves significant expense to defendants with no possibility of re-
covery for the corporation. To require independent counsel in
such a situation would result in time delays and a waste of corpo-
rate assets. Moreover, the unnecessary expenses encountered in
obtaining separate counsel would ultimately be borne by the share-
146. MODEL RULES Rule 1.7. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
147. For a discussion of various factual patterns see infra notes 151-59 and accompa-
nying text.
148. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
149. MODEL CODE EC 5-15.
150. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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holders of the corporation. '52
In sharp contrast to the defendants' unity of interests in the
strike suit context is the situation in which, in a potentially merito-
rious action, the individual director-officer defendants are charged
with fraud or illegality. The interests of the corporation and the
individual defendants are, in such an instance, totally divergent be-
cause the corporation must in its best interests pursue the recovery
of any benefits fraudulently obtained by individual defendants. 15 3
Even courts such as the Otis court, which exhibited in general a
deference to choice of counsel, 154 have recognized that joint repre-
sentation in this situation is probably not in the best interests of the
parties.'55 Where fraud against the corporation is the essence of
the charges against the individual defendants, right to choice of
counsel is outweighed by the considerable potential for conflict of
interest, and independent counsel must be obtained.' 56
Review of derivative actions reveals other factual settings in
which the unity or divergence of corporate and individual interests
is not as clearly defined. 157 In certain of these settings, the defend-
ants' interests may be so harmonious that multiple representation
does not threaten the attorney's duty of undivided loyalty to his
clients. Such cases typically involve attacks upon transactions ap-
proved as a result of the business judgment of the corporation's
board of directors. 158 Where independent directors believe in good
faith in the validity of the business judgment and believe also that a
defense against minority shareholder charges is in the best interests
of the corporation, corporate counsel should be permitted to repre-
sent the corporation and the individual defendants because they
have common interests. 159
152. Schwartz v. Guterman, 109 Misc. 2d 1007, 1008, 441 N.Y.S.2d 597, 598 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1981); see also In re Conduct of Kinsey, 294 Or. 544, 561, 660 P.2d 660, 669
(1983) (stating, in dicta, that disqualification is not mandated where the claim is patently
frivolous).
153. ABA/BNA LAWYERS MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT at 91:2602
(1984).
154. Otis, 57 F. Supp. 680; see supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
155. Yablonski, 448 F.2d at 1182; United States v. R.M.I. Co., 467 F. Supp. 915, 920-
21 (W.D. Pa. 1979); Perillo v. Advisory Comm. on Professional Ethics, 83 N.J. 366, 376
n.2, 416 A.2d 801, 807 n.2 (1980).
156. See Messing, 439 F. Supp at 782.
157. See, e.g., Jacuzzi v. Jacuzzi Bros., Inc., 243 Cal. App. 201, 52 Cal Rptr. 147
(1966) (action seeking rescission of corporation's sale of foreign holdings).
158. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
159. This approach is consistent with judicial respect for, and deference to, good faith
decisions of independent litigation committees. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying
text.
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These are just some factual settings which might be analyzed to
determine the propriety of multiple representation in derivative
suits. Each derivative action must be evaluated on its own facts in
arriving at a balance between choice of counsel and avoidance of a
conflict of interest between the co-defendants.16"
Selection of Counsel
If it is determined, after analysis of the particular setting, that
potential conflict exists such that multiple representation is imper-
missible, the question remains as to how a bar to such representa-
tion may best be implemented. Courts and commentators agree
that the corporation should retain independent counsel. 161 The al-
ternative solution of requiring the individuals to secure new coun-
sel while the corporation retains its original attorney has been
rejected because loyalties to directors and officers might create on
the part of the corporate counsel a residual bias in favor of the
individual defendants which could undermine the quality of corpo-
rate representation. 162
As to the selection process, it has been uniformly held that the
corporation's board of directors, rather than the courts, may make
the selection. 63 The selection of independent counsel by impli-
cated directors does not create an insurmountable problem. " The
newly selected attorney, cognizant of his ethical responsibilities,
should recognize his duty to represent only the corporate entity's
interests. 165 Additionally, judicial relief is available should
problems arise in the selection process. 166 Selection of independent
counsel by the corporation's board of directors is entirely appropri-
ate as it recognizes the independence of the corporate entity and
the management powers of the board of directors and does not ex-
acerbate the loss of corporate autonomy already involved in forgo-
ing the representation of traditional corporate counsel. 167
160. Only if counsel is convinced that he is capable of representing his clients with
vigor and undiluted loyalty, and only if independent representatives of the coporation
approve such representation after full disclosure, may dual representation occur.
161. See, e.g., Cannon, 398 F. Supp. at 220; Lewis, 218 F. Supp. at 240; Comment,
supra note 13, at 533.
162. Comment, supra note 13, at 533.
163. See, e.g., Cannon, 398 F. Supp. at 220; Lewis, 218 F. Supp. at 240.
164. Lewis, 218 F. Supp. at 240.
165. Cannon, 398 F. Supp. at 220.
166. Id.
167. See supra notes 114-15.
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CONCLUSION
A determination of the propriety of multiple representation in
shareholder derivative suits involves a delicate balancing of the
corporation's right to counsel of its choice and the attorney's ethi-
cal responsibility to provide undivided loyalty to his clients.
Achievement of the proper balance is best served by a case-by-case
analysis of the facts present in a particular derivative action rather
than by a per se disallowance of multiple representation.
MARGUERITE M. ELIAS

